Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Deterrence: Deterrence in psychology is discouraging unwanted actions through fear of negative consequences. It relies on manipulating imagined costs and benefits to shape decision-making, often using threats or punishment. See also Punishment, Costs, Decisions, Decision-making processes._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Social Psychology on Deterrence - Dictionary of Arguments
Parisi I 141 Retribution/law/Social psychology/Nadler/Mueller: Two prevalent normative theories of punishment in the legal literature are retribution (or "just deserts") and utilitarianism (specific or general deterrence, as well as incapacitation and rehabilitation) (Hart, 2008(1); Ten, 1987(2)). (...) only recently have researchers systematically investigated the psychological influence of deterrence and retribution motives on people's punishment judgments. >Utilitarianism, >Retribution. Psychology: The results indicate an interesting division: in the abstract, people explicitly endorse utilitarian goals (e.g. successful deterrence leading to crime reduction), but when presented with a specific scenario, they consistently choose to impose retributive punishments (Carlsmith, 2008)(3). Retribution: This evidence suggests that people are intuitive retributivists, making judgments based on intuitions about just deserts, though these intuitive judgments can sometimes be overridden by more reasoned considerations (see Carlsmith and Darley, 2008(4) for a review). Morality: At the same time, the reasoning process itself may be oriented toward retribution: when an array of different information is made available, participants are more likely to choose to obtain information about moral severity and other retributive factors, rather than information relevant to utilitarian aims (Carlsmith, 2006(5); Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson, 2002(6)). >Morals, >Morality. Consequentialism: Indeed, certain consequentialist moral decisions, despite being socially approved, give rise to the inference that the agent making or carrying out the decision is of inferior moral character (Uhlmann, Zhu, and Tannenbaum, 2013)(7). >Consequentialism. Example: e,.g., deciding to sacrifice one life to save multiple lives can lead to negative character inferences about the agent, even though the decision is regarded as morally correct (Uhlmann et al., 2013)(7). Restoration: Restorative justice goals are also intuitively appealing in some cases. In contrast with retribution, restorative justice aims to repair the harm that was caused through processes in which the offender, victim, and perhaps community members determine an appropriate reparative sanction (Bazemore, 1998(8); Braithwaite, 2002(9)). This justice goal is compatible with retribution; when given a choice, even for severe crimes, most participants choose a consequence with both retributive and restorative components over consequences that fulfill only one ofthose goals (Gromet and Darley, 2006)(10). >Justice, >Equality. 1. Hart, H. L. A. (2008). Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Ten, C. L. (1987). Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A Philosophical Introduction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. Carlsmith, K. M. (2008). "On Justifying Punishment: The Discrepancy Between Words and Actions." Social Justice Research 21 (2): 119-137. doi:10.1007 /sl 1211-008-OOO-X. 4. Carlsmith, K. M. and J. M. Darley (2008). "Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice," in Mark P. Zanna, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 40, 193-236. San Diego: Academic Press. 5. Carlsmith, K. M. (2006). "The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Pun- ishment." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 42(4): 43 7—451. doi: 10.1016/ j.jesp.2005.06.007. 6. Carlsmith, K. M., J. M. Darley, and P. H. Robinson (2002). "Why Do We Punish?: Deterrence and Just Desserts as Motives for Punishment." Journal of Personality and social Psychology doi:10.103 7/0022-3514.83.2.284. 7. Uhlmann, E. L., L. (Lei) Zhu, and D. Tannenbaum (2013). "When It Takes a Bad Person to Do the Right Thing." Cognition doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2012.10.005. 8. Bazemore, G. (1998). "Restorative Justice and Earned Redemption Communities, Victims, and Offender Reintegration." American Behavioral Scientist 41(6): 768-813. doi:10.1177/0002764298041006003. 9. Braithwaite, J. (2002). Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation. New York: Oxford Uni- versity Press. 10. Gromet, D. M. and J. M. Darley (2009). "Punishment and Beyond: Achieving Justice Through the Satisfaction of Multiple Goals." Law and society Review 43(1): 1-38. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Social Psychology Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
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